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This paper regards the incidence of in-work poverty and how it is reduced by the pay-
ment of social transfers in 20 European countries. It combines a micro- and a macro-
level perspective in two-level models. The basis for the analysis is micro-data from the 
EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) 2005 and macro-data from 
sources such as the OECD and Eurostat. The broad comparative perspective allows for a 
separation of different institutional influences, namely the influence of the degree of 
decommodification, defamilisation and bargaining centralisation. In contrast to previous 
studies on the working poor which have mainly described country differences in in-
work poverty, this paper focuses on the question of how such differences can be ex-
plained from a broader perspective of poverty research. In general, the results confirm 
the overall hypothesis that both welfare state measures and labour market institutions 
have an influence on in-work poverty. By analysing influences on pre-transfer poverty 
and poverty reduction separately, I show that such factors have varied effects on in-
work poverty. While bargaining centralisation proves to be relevant for the distribution 
of pre-transfer incomes only, the set-up of the social security system in particular im-
pacts the extent of poverty reduction. 
                                                 
∗ The major part of the paper is based on my research carried out at the Chair of Empiri-
cal Social and Economic Research, Faculty of Business Administration, Economics and 
Social Sciences, University of Cologne, Cologne/Germany. I would like to thank Hans-
Jürgen Andreß for comments on an earlier draft of the paper. 
  1. Introduction 
 
For a long time, in-work poverty was not associated with European welfare states. Re-
cently the issue has drawn increasing attention as a potential consequence of welfare 
state change which is associated with an emphasis on labour market inclusion in favour 
of social security (Gilbert, 2002; Barbier, 2004). This is also reflected at the level of 
policy making. For instance, in its guidelines for the employment policies of the Mem-
ber States, the Council of the European Union stresses that “[e]fforts to raise employ-
ment rates go hand in hand with […] reducing the share of working poor” (Council of 
the EU, 2005: 3). The perceived need for poverty reducing measures is driven by the 
notion of a significant share of working poor in Europe. But earlier research also shows 
that this share clearly differs from one country to the next (see, e.g., Peña-Casas and 
Latta, 2004; Bardone and Guio, 2005). Not much is known about the causes for these 
differences. This paper aims to answer why the incidence of in-work poverty differs 
within Europe. In a comparison of 20 European countries, I will analyse how institu-
tional factors such as the system of wage bargaining or the transfer system explain dif-
ferences in in-work poverty rates and how poverty is reduced in the process of income 
redistribution. 
This paper looks at in-work poverty from the perspective of general comparative 
poverty research (see e.g. Atkinson et al., 1995; Förster and Pellizari, 2000; Moller et 
al., 2003), which argues that a person’s welfare is generated at household level. Hence, 
personal low wages, which are often in the focus of studies on the working poor (Marx 
and Verbist, 1998; Brandolini et al., 2002; Gardiner and Millar, 2006) are regarded as 
only one cause of in-work poverty. At least two other factors influence a worker’s pov-
erty risk. Other earners may contribute to household income. Furthermore, transfers 
may play a crucial role in lifting poor workers out of poverty. To explain country differ-
  1ences in in-work poverty, we have to take into account differences not only in the inci-
dence of low wages but also in the accumulation of earned incomes within households, 
in the availability and take-up of benefits. The differences between countries in each of 
these areas are explained by different institutional factors. Taken together these institu-
tional differences are expected to explain the variation in the structure and incidence of 
in-work poverty. In a comparison of 13 European countries, Lohmann (2007, forthcom-
ing) finds support for this hypothesis and shows that in-work poverty rates differ sig-
nificantly according to country-specific institutional settings. This paper partly draws on 
these earlier analyses. However, in order to be able to disentangle the various influences 
which cumulate into higher or lower poverty rates, I analyse separately how institutional 
factors shape the incidence of pre-transfer poverty (which is calculated on the basis of 
disposable household income minus social transfers) and the extent to which poverty is 
reduced by such transfers. The latter analysis examines which groups of the pre-transfer 
poor are not poor after social transfers are added to household income. By analysing 
pre-transfer poverty and poverty reduction separately, it is possible to answer an impor-
tant question: Do the higher or lower incidences of in-work poverty have to be attrib-
uted to differences in labour market institutions, or do variations in welfare state charac-
teristics play a more important role? Although the paper is primarily interested in rela-
tionships at the macro level, it also considers micro-level influences. This multilevel 
perspective takes into account the way in which characteristics of the institutional 
framework alter individual poverty risks and the likelihood of moving out of poverty 
due to the receipt of transfers. Furthermore, we can control for country-specific differ-
ences in the composition of workers and their households in a broader, more encom-
passing manner that is often not possible when only considering relationships at the 
macro level.  
  2  The paper is organised as follows: The second section discusses the influence of 
the institutional framework on the incidence of in-work poverty. Section 3 examines 
poverty risk factors at the individual level and differences in the reduction of poverty. 
The empirical analyses are based on data from the EU Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions (EU-SILC) 2005 and macro-data from sources such as the OECD and Euro-
stat. A discussion of the data and methods (Section 4) is followed by a descriptive over-
view (Section 5) of cross-country differences in in-work poverty and the extent to which 
transfers reduce poverty. Section 6 presents the results of the multivariate empirical 
analysis. A conclusion is given in Section 7.  
 
2. The influence of welfare state measures and labour market institutions 
 
It is a straightforward assumption that labour market institutions influence the incidence 
of pre-transfer poverty while welfare state measures primarily affect the extent of pov-
erty reduction. In fact, the discussion on labour market institutions and income inequal-
ity usually refers to earnings. Previous research suggests that labour market institutions 
play a key role in explaining the extent of low-wage work as well as the distribution of 
wages (Lucifora et al., 2005; Blau and Kahn, 1996; Teulings and Hartog, 1997). In par-
ticular, institutional features like centralised and/or coordinated wage-setting are likely 
to affect the incidence of low wages. Many studies also show an influence of union den-
sity on the distribution of wages (Freeman, 1993; DiNardo et al., 1996; Rueda and 
Pontusson, 2000). But since union density does not necessarily translate into a high or 
low level of bargaining coverage, it seems more adequate to examine features of the 
bargaining system. In particular, the finding that bargaining centralisation encourages 
wage equality has gained broad empirical support (Golden and Londregan, 2006). Thus, 
I hypothesise that the system of wage bargaining has an influence on the extent of in-
  3work poverty. To be exact I expect that a higher level of bargaining centralisation low-
ers the numbers of pre-transfer working poor.  
  Regarding welfare state characteristics, we can distinguish the degree of de-
commodification and defamilisation. While the concept of decommodification is de-
fined as the reduction of individuals’ reliance on the market for their well-being (Esp-
ing-Andersen, 1990), defamilisation is defined as the reduction of a person’s depend-
ence on the family (McLaughlin and Glendinning, 1994; Lister, 1994). In technical 
terms, decommodification describes the extent to which the welfare state provides trans-
fers to those outside the labour market (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Scruggs and Allan, 
2006). As far as poverty in general is concerned, it is obvious that the degree of de-
commodification is related to the incidence of poverty, since the poverty risk of the job-
less depends strongly on the availability and level of transfers (Atkinson et al., 1995; 
Kenworthy, 1999; Förster and Pellizari, 2000; Sainsbury and Morissens, 2002; Moller 
et al., 2003). With respect to the working poor, this relationship is less obvious. How-
ever, we can distinguish two relevant mechanisms. From the perspective of economic 
work incentives, we can argue that the level of transfers influences the level of wages 
workers are willing to accept and thus the level of earnings. This is assumed to have an 
influence on the incidence of pre-transfer poverty. While this influence is indirect, it 
will be easier to detect a direct influence from the increase of household income through 
transfers. Also workers can claim benefits. This is the case not only if specific in-work 
benefits exist but also if earned incomes are below the transfer threshold. However, 
relevant in-work benefits are paid in Ireland and the UK only (OECD 2005). As a con-
sequence, in most countries transfers paid to other household members are more impor-
tant (Lohmann 2007). Such transfers increase the household income and thus decrease 
the risk of being poor for jobless and working individuals alike. Therefore, the more 
  4generous the benefits paid to working and non-working persons, the greater the chances 
that the working poor will be lifted out of poverty.
1  
  As defined above, defamilisation has to do with independence from one’s fam-
ily. This concept concerns women’s independence from care obligations and a male 
main earner (Orloff, 1993; Lister, 1994), the independence of unemployed or low-paid 
adult children from their parents (Paugam and Russell, 2000), and the independence of 
the elderly from their children (McLaughlin and Glendinning, 1994). In terms of poli-
cies, defamilisation is achieved via dual-earner policies such as care for children and the 
elderly as well as through policies aimed at the economic independence of young un-
employed persons. These policies are relevant for an analysis of in-work poverty in a 
twofold manner. First, care obligations restrict female employment—or more generally, 
restrict the possibility of having more than one earner per household—which is related 
to a higher risk of being poor. Hence, I expect an influence on the incidence of pre-
transfer poverty. Second, in situations where unemployed adults live with other family 
members—in other words: situations with a higher degree of intergenerational depend-
ency—this has an influence on the relationship of needs to earned incomes in these 
households. Larger households have greater needs and thus are more likely to be poor. 
Again, this will mainly affect pre-transfer poverty and not the extent of poverty reduc-
tion. Intergenerational dependency could, however, be interpreted in a positive way as 
well because it provides protection within the family. This is not expected to be the case 
for all workers, however, but rather for specific groups like younger adults. In addition 
to the impact of dual-earner support and intergenerational dependence, there is a third 
factor that affects working families’ likelihood of being poor. Many welfare states offer 
general family support in the form of cash child benefits or tax deductions in order to 
compensate for the higher needs and employment restrictions of families. Since ‘having 
children’ is in many countries the only precondition to receive child benefits, most 
  5working families will benefit from such transfers (see, e.g., Strengmann-Kuhn 2003). 
Therefore, I expect that the generosity of child benefits has a positive influence on the 
extent of poverty reduction. 
 
3. Individual and household-related factors 
 
As for institutional influences, we can expect that the influence of individual- and 
household-related factors differs depending on whether we look at pre-transfer poverty 
or the extent of poverty reduction. First, influences on the incidence of pre-transfer pov-
erty are discussed. Poverty research has established a number of individual and house-
hold-related factors that influence the risk of being poor. In broad terms, these can be 
classified as factors related to ‘needs’ and to ‘resources’. Needs are imposed by a given 
household structure as already discussed in the section above. In general terms, larger 
households have larger needs and these needs differ according to the age of the house-
hold members. Furthermore, the risk of being poor is influenced by the resources a per-
son has at his or her command. Crucial resources are those that allow for successful 
participation in the labour market—such as education, labour market experience and 
occupation. In addition to ‘needs’ and ‘resources,’ there are ‘restrictions’ on labour 
market participation, such as care obligations for children or elderly people in a given 
household.  
  Which individual and household-specific characteristics can we expect to alter 
the extent of poverty reduction? In other words, who is more likely to move out of pov-
erty after transfers have been taken into account? Differences are likely to be structured 
according to the differences in the availability and in the take-up of benefits. Both differ 
depending on which type of benefit we are looking at. In broad terms, we can distin-
guish among unemployment benefits, social assistance benefits, family benefits, and 
  6old-age benefits. Since I will look at individuals of working age, it seems adequate to 
disregard the impact of the latter. Since in most systems only workers with a solid work 
history receive unemployment benefits, I assume that the poverty reduction of such 
benefits is higher for older workers. Since in some countries young adults are not eligi-
ble for social assistance either, this will work into the same direction. Most obvious is 
the situation in the case of family benefits (Immervoll et al., 2001). For workers with 
children I expect a stronger impact of transfers on the degree of poverty reduction.  
In addition to the availability of transfers, differences in group-specific benefit 
take-up rates will have an impact on the extent of poverty reduction. Previous research 
discusses a number of influences on the probability of benefit take-up such as informa-
tion deficits, the level of expected entitlements, and the costs associated with claiming 
(Kerr, 1982; van Oorschot, 1991). Accordingly, employed people are less likely to 
claim benefits, which can be explained by their limited time budget in comparison to the 
non-working population and by the fact that they stand to receive lower benefits since 
they are receiving at least some income from work. In addition, they appear less likely 
to claim benefits due to fears of stigmatisation, since it is mainly the unemployed who 
claim benefits. This is not to say, however, that the working poor do not claim benefits 
at all. A number of studies have shown that transfers are a crucial part in the budget of 
working households near or below the poverty line (Strengmann-Kuhn, 2003; Laga-
renne and Legendre, 2000; Lohmann, 2007). If we apply the expectations concerning 
costs and benefits to the working poor, it can be expected that workers who are working 
longer hours and have higher incomes are less likely to claim benefits. Furthermore, I 
assume that benefit take-up rates among the self-employed will be lower since it will be 
more difficult for this group to provide sufficient information about earned incomes. 
Underreporting of income to tax authorities acts as an additional disincentive for the 
self-employed to claim benefits. Due to information deficits and problems in complying 
  7with administrative procedures, migrants and persons with low education are expected 
to be less likely to claim benefits. In addition, I assume that households with more than 
one adult are more likely to claim benefits because their time restrictions are less severe 
than those of households with single adults. Previous research also shows a curvilinear 
influence of age (Kayser and Frick, 2001). Younger and older persons are less likely to 
claim benefits than middle age groups. It is, however, unclear if this relationship is the 
same for the working poor. Furthermore, it will not be possible to differentiate aspects 
of benefit availability and benefit take-up in the empirical analysis. Since the lower 
availability of transfers for younger persons partly works against the age differences in 
benefit take-up, it is difficult to predict an aggregate effect. In contrast, an unambiguous 
effect can be expected for groups like migrants and low-qualified workers, who are less 
likely to have information about existing benefits and claiming procedures. I expect that 
these groups benefit less from available transfers and therefore are less likely to be lifted 
out of poverty.  
 
4. Joint analysis of micro and macro influences – multilevel analysis 
 
As discussed in Sections 2 and 3, we can expect macro as well as micro-level influences 
to explain the variance in in-work poverty. The following analysis examines these influ-
ences jointly using a multilevel approach. As discussed in Section 2, I hypothesise that 
welfare state characteristics and labour market institutions—i.e., macro-level influ-
ences—have an effect on the incidence of pre-transfer in-work poverty as well as the 
degree of poverty reduction via transfers. In addition, Section 3 introduced a number of 
micro-level influences. Furthermore, we can expect these micro-influences to interact 
with macro-influences (cross-level interactions). In other words, the strength of indi-
vidual risk factors can be expected to differ according to the setup of the institutional 
  8framework. Along with micro, macro, and cross-level influences, an additional aspect 
must be taken into account when comparing the extent of in-work poverty and poverty 
reduction at the aggregate level. There are differences in the composition of the working 
population (e.g., female employment, working time, size and structure of the house-
holds people live in) which explain part of the differences in aggregate rates. We cannot 
regard these factors as exogenous; rather, they are to a large extent the consequence of 
welfare state measures. Hence, controlling for such micro-level differences already 
picks up part of the institutional differences.  
 
Micro-data 
The empirical analyses are based on the European Community Statistics on Income and 
Living Conditions 2005 (EU-SILC), which contains comparable data on all EU-25 
countries (except Malta) plus Norway and Iceland (Eurostat, 2007). Since sufficient 
data on the institutional framework (see next section) does not exist for all of these 26 
countries, a number of countries had to be excluded. These countries are Estonia, 
Lithuania, Latvia, Cyprus, Slovenia, and Iceland. This leaves a sample of 20 countries, 
which covers the EU-15 countries plus four of the Eastern-Continental member states 
and Norway.  
  Income data in EU-SILC is collected for the year before the survey. Hence, the 
analyses regard the situation in 2004. Therefore, the definition of “working” also ap-
plies to the year before the survey. A person is defined as working if he or she has been 
working at least seven months out of twelve. The population in question is defined as 
workers living in private households, over 17 and below 65 years of age. The focus in 
this paper is on pre-transfer poverty and the impact of social transfers (except old-age 
benefits as they are not regarded as central for the working poor).
2 Pre-transfer income 
is defined as disposable income minus social transfers. A person is pre-transfer poor if 
  9he or she lives in a household with an equivalised (modified OCED-scale) pre-transfer 
household income below 60 percent of the median.
3 A second poverty line is computed 
on the basis of equivalised post-transfer household income. If a person is poor accord-
ing to the pre-transfer poverty line but not according to the post-transfer line we can 
assume that poverty has been reduced via the receipt of transfers.
4 In the following I 
speak—for the sake of brevity—of poverty reduction if I mean that a person is lifted out 
of poverty after transfers have been taken into account. 
It is more common to look at the extent of poverty reduction from a macro per-
spective. The difference between pre-transfer and post-transfer poverty rates divided by 
the pre-transfer rate is usually interpreted as the extent of poverty reduction. However, 
there are not only persons who move out of poverty due to the payment of transfers. 
There are also persons who are not poor according to the pre-transfer poverty line but 
poor according to the post-transfer poverty line (poverty increase).
5 In a macro perspec-
tive, we usually ignore this group. Since we cannot ignore this group in a micro per-
spective we have to differentiate between net poverty reduction and gross poverty re-
duction. The former is the concept often used in macro comparisons, while the latter is 
the one defined in the paragraph above. In the descriptive analysis (Section 5), we will 
see that aggregate gross and net reductions are highly correlated. Therefore, in the mul-
tivariate analysis I will ignore the aspect of poverty increases within the process of re-
distribution and only examine the extent of gross poverty reduction. 
  The analysis consists of two sets of multivariate models. First, I examine which 
factors influence the probability that a working person is pre-transfer poor. Second, I 
analyse which characteristics increase the probability that poor persons will move out of 
poverty after transfers are paid (poverty reduction). I use the same set of independent 
variables in both analyses but partly expect different influences (see the discussion in 
Section 3). The structure of a household a person lives in is measured by a set of vari-
  10ables that record the number of persons living in each individual’s household by age 
group (0-2, 3-5, 6-12, 13-17, and 18+ years). To control for the specific situation of 
single parents and women after separation, marital status (dummy variable indicating 
separation or divorce), gender, and a respective interaction effect (separa-
tion/divorce*gender) are also included in the models. Age is included in form of a linear 
and a quadratic term. Education is expected to influence the ability to generate income 
through labour market participation and may also have an impact on the likelihood of 
benefit take-up. Education is included as a set of dummy variables (ISCED 0-2/3/4-6). 
Furthermore, a dummy variable is included that differentiates the autochthonous popu-
lation from the immigrant population.
6 A number of variables deal with a person’s em-
ployment situation. I differentiate between self-employed (including unpaid family 
members) and other workers. Like employment, also self-employment is defined on the 
basis of the information about the year before the survey. Most persons were either em-
ployed or self-employed. Some persons, however, were in self-employment for some 
months only. Workers are regarded as self-employed if they were self-employed at least 
half the time they were employed during the year before the survey. In the same manner 
we can differentiate part-time workers from full-time workers. The models contain con-
trols for occupation consisting of a number of dummy variables (ISCO-88, one-digit 
level). Since earned income from other household members is expected to play a role in 
explaining the risk of being poor, as is the likelihood of benefit take-up, the number of 
employed household members is controlled for. The respective variables record the 
number of additional workers in a person’s household (apart from the person 
him/herself), partly differentiated by working time.  
 
Macro-data 
  11Table 1 provides an overview of the definition and sources of the macro indicators. The 
indicators describe the situation in the year 2003 or 2004. Since an Esping-Andersen-
style decommodification index (Scruggs and Allan, 2006) does not exist for all the 
countries dealt with in this paper, the indicator simply reflects the level of unemploy-
ment benefits (as a percentage of the average wage of a production worker – APW). The 




<Table 1: Definition and sources of macro indicators> 
 
  As discussed in Section 3, the concept of defamilisation covers different dimen-
sions. Dual-earner support and general family support are measured by the level of pub-
lic expenditure on family services and family cash transfers (both as a percentage of 
GDP). The figures are taken from the OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX). The 
indicator of intergenerational dependence is the share of young unemployed (20-29 
years) who live in their parents’ household (by country, computed on the basis of EU-
SILC). Information on the level of wage bargaining centralisation has been taken from 
Visser (2004: 43). 
  Table 2 provides information on the means and the variation of these macro in-
dicators. I will comment briefly on these figures in order to give an impression of the 
total variation. Average replacement rates vary from 6 percent of the APW (Italy) to 
about 80 percent (Denmark, Sweden, Netherlands, Luxembourg). There is only one 
country that spends more than two percent of its GDP on family services (Denmark). 
Respective spending is lowest in Ireland and Greece. Average spending on family cash 
benefits is higher than spending on services. Many countries spend about two percent of 
its GDP on family transfers. Luxembourg, which spends 3.5 percent, is a positive out-
  12lier. Spain, like other Southern European countries, is found at the bottom of the distri-
bution. We can also observe clear differences in the share of young unemployed living 
with their parents. In Northern European countries, this share is usually lower than in 
Southern and Central-Eastern Europe. While in Denmark only 11 percent of the young 
unemployed live with their parents, the respective share is 83 percent in Greece.
8 The 
indicator for bargaining centralisation ranges from 0.13 to 0.71. While wage bargaining 
is decentralised in the UK, it is most centralised in Austria. Unemployment rates and 
economic growth rates are included as control variables. There are exceptional rates of 
unemployment in Poland and the Slovak Republic (18 and 19 percent). It is not higher 
than 10.6 percent (Spain) in the rest of the countries, and lowest in Norway and Ireland. 
Per capita growth is higher than four percent in Luxembourg, Ireland, Greece, and the 
Eastern-Continental countries. It is exceptionally low in Italy, Germany, and Portugal 
(not higher than 1.1 percent).  
 
<Table 2: Means and variation of macro indicators> 
 
  In addition, some of the models contain cross-level interaction effects. It is a 
straightforward assumption that higher spending on family services lowers the poverty 
risk associated with having young children because it offers better chances to reconcile 
work and family. Intergenerational dependency can be seen as a factor that shifts the 
poverty risk from younger to older workers (due to young unemployed and low-wage 
workers living with their parents). Accordingly, a positive interaction between age and 
intergenerational dependence can be assumed. Centralised bargaining is expected to 
have an influence on the earnings differential by skills because the equalising impact of 
centralisation is mainly found at the lower end of the earnings distribution (see e.g. Blau 
and Kahn, 1996). As a consequence, low-skilled workers can expect higher wages in 
  13countries with centralised bargaining systems. Poverty reduction is expected to be 
stronger for workers with children in countries with higher spending on family cash 
benefits. Hence, additional models contain these respective interactions terms.  
 
Modelling strategy 
From the perspective of multilevel analysis, we can describe the EU-SILC as two-level 
data with individuals nested within countries (see, e.g., Snijders and Bosker, 1999). A 
general problem in estimating regression models from nested data is that the assumption 
of independence of errors across observations is likely to be violated. A common ap-
proach to dealing with this kind of data is to estimate a random intercept model in 
which the error term contains a unit-specific random component ui which captures the 
country-specific unobserved characteristics. If the assumption holds that ui is uncorre-
lated with any of the independent variables, the random intercept model will yield unbi-
ased and efficient estimates. Under the same assumptions, a standard regression model 
(in the linear case OLS) will also result in unbiased estimates. However, the estimates 
will be inefficient. Furthermore, the random intercept model allows us to differentiate 
between country- and person-level variance. On the basis of the variance components, 
we can compute the intraclass correlation rho which indicates the country-level variance 
as a fraction of total variance.  Given the dichotomous nature of the dependent variables 
(poor/not poor and move out of poverty/stay in poverty, after transfers are taken into 
account) all the models are specified as logistic regressions.
9  
 
5. In-work poverty and reduction of poverty in 20 European countries 
 
Table 3 shows the incidence of in-work poverty and the extent of poverty reduction via 
social transfers in all of the 20 countries which are examined in this paper.
10 For better 
  14orientation, the countries are grouped regionally, which produces a strong overlap with 
broadly used welfare state typologies. On average, pre-transfer poverty is lowest in the 
countries of the Scandinavian cluster, followed by the Western-Continental and the An-
glo-Saxon countries. Pre-transfer poverty is clearly higher in the Southern European 
countries and in three of the Eastern-Continental countries. However, the variation in 
some of the clusters is rather high, in particular within the two continental clusters. The 
picture slightly changes if we move to post-transfer poverty. Now in all Scandinavian 
countries in-work poverty is low. Again, low poverty rates can also be observed in 
countries of the Western-Continental and the Eastern-Continental cluster (Belgium, 
Germany, Czech Republic). The Southern European cluster is the one with the most 
consistent results. In these countries, post-transfer in-work poverty tends to be high.  
 
<Table 3: Pre-transfer poverty, post-transfer poverty and poverty reduction> 
 
This is clearly due to the modest impact of transfer payments in Southern Europe. In 
these countries on average, the difference between the pre-transfer and post-transfer 
poverty (net reduction) is less than a percentage point. This is the result of two mecha-
nisms. On the one hand, in Southern Europe not many of the pre-transfer poor find 
themselves above the poverty line after transfers are paid (small gross reduction). On 
the other hand, compared to the rest of the countries, a larger proportion of the popula-
tion finds themselves below the poverty line (large gross increase). Nevertheless, in all 
countries including the Southern European countries, the post-transfer rate is lower than 
the pre-transfer rate. In addition, Table 3 reports the relative degree of poverty reduction 
which is often more adequate because in absolute terms poverty reduction can be high 
simply because we start off from a higher level of pre-transfer poverty.  
 
  156.  Explaining poverty risks and the extent of poverty reduction 
 
As argued above I expect that in-work poverty and the extent of poverty reduction dif-
fers according to a number micro- and macro-level determinants. I start with the analy-
sis of the influence of micro-level determinants. Table 4 shows the results of two-level 
random intercept models for both dependent variables. The empty models (M0) are the 
starting point for the further steps of analysis because they give us the information how 
much of the variance of the respective variables is variance between countries. The frac-
tion of between-country variance in pre-transfer poverty is low (rho=0.042). The degree 
of poverty reduction differs more by country, which is reflected in a higher intraclass 
correlation (rho=0.157).
11
Before I consider these country differences in more detail, I will first discuss the 
individual pre-transfer poverty risk factors that are expected to reflect the position of 
workers in the labour market and the effect of redistribution within the household (re-
sults in the left panel of Table 4). The direction of the coefficients in Model 1 (M1) 
shows which groups of the working population are affected by poverty. The results are 
mostly in line with results from general poverty research. There are differences accord-
ing to age, education, and marital status. As far as age is concerned, we find a U-shaped 
influence. The risk of being a member of the working poor is lowest for the middle age 
groups. Higher education lowers the risk of being poor. As expected, migrants face 
higher poverty risks, which reflects their more precarious position in the labour market. 
How far this can be attributed to discrimination or unobserved aspects of (lower) quali-
fication cannot be distinguished on the basis of these results. Women are more likely to 
be poor than men. The difference is more pronounced without controlling for job char-
acteristics like part-time work and occupation (results not reported). The fact that sepa-
  16ration or divorce is often accompanied by economic strain for women is reflected by a 
higher poverty risk among this group.  
 
<Table 4: Coefficients of micro models> 
 
The household context also strongly influences the risk of belonging to the working 
poor. The larger a person’s household, the more likely s/he is to be poor. While the 
number of household members reflects the needs of a household and—in the case of 
small children—potential restrictions on labour market participation, additional workers 
in a household are likely to lower the risk of poverty. Not surprisingly, this effect is 
strongest in the case of additional full-time workers. But also workers who live together 
with part-time workers are less likely to be poor. As in the case of additional workers, 
the working time of the worker him/herself influences the person’s risk of being poor. 
Part-time workers face a higher risk of poverty than full-time workers. Also self-
employed workers are more likely to be poor. It is, however, unclear to what extent this 
can be attributed to an underreporting of earnings from self-employment. When we look 
at occupation, agricultural workers are at the highest risk of being poor. Apart from this, 
there are clear differences between high-skilled and low-skilled workers.  
  Table 4 (right panel) shows that also the extent of poverty reduction differs ac-
cording to individual and household-related factors. For some groups with high poverty 
risks, transfers clearly work against their disadvantageous position in the pre-transfer 
distribution of incomes. As expected, workers with children—in particular young chil-
dren—are lifted out poverty by transfer payments more often than others. The same 
applies to women and workers who are living together with other adults. There are, 
however, also groups that profit less from transfers although they also face above aver-
age poverty risks. As I have argued, migrants and workers with low qualifications are 
  17less likely to claim benefits due to their greater difficulties complying with administra-
tive procedures. The respective negative effects in the model seem to confirm this ex-
pectation. However, the influence of education is insignificant according to usual stan-
dards. The self-employed are a third group with a higher pre-transfer poverty risk and a 
lower probability that poverty will be reduced via transfers.  In addition, workers in 
households with other workers are less likely to be lifted out of poverty by transfers. If 
we assume that households with more than one worker are likely to have a higher in-
come than single-earner households, the expectation of lower transfers could explain 
this result. Regarding occupations, we can differentiate two groups of workers. First, 
there are higher officials/managers and agricultural workers, who have lower chances of 
being pulled out of poverty via transfers. Second, there are the rest of the occupations, 
which show fairly small and probably insignificant differences for the majority of 
workers.  
  I have argued above that country-level variation is probably already explained 
by individual-level factors due to composition effects. As we can see by comparing the 
variance components of the full models (M1) against the empty models (M0), this holds 
true only in the case of poverty reduction. But still a large proportion of variance re-
mains unexplained since person-level variables explain only 11 percent of the country-
level variance (rho=0.140 vs. 0.157). Therefore, let us turn to the major question of this 
paper, namely whether differences between countries can be explained by institutional 
factors. In a first step, I look at how country differences in pre-transfer poverty can be 
explained (Table 5) before I move to the question of poverty reduction. Given the small 
amount of between-country variance in pre-transfer poverty, we start with models that 
examine only single factors at the macro level (M2 a-e). Step by step, these models are 
expanded to more complex models. I have argued that bargaining centralisation will 
have the most important effect on pre-transfer poverty but that also the relation of needs 
  18and income in a household may play a role. With regard to the latter, I assume that the 
availability of family services like child care increases the number of earners per house-
hold and that intergenerational dependence increases the needs of a household. The first 
column of Table 5 reports the results of five different models, each containing a single 
indicator. As expected, there is evidence that bargaining centralisation and factors 
which affect the relationship of needs and resources within the household influence 
worker’s pre-transfer poverty risk. Poverty is lower in countries with centralised bar-
gaining systems and higher if the share of young unemployed living with their parents is 
high. In addition, pre-transfer poverty tends to be lower in countries that spend more on 
family services. However, the effect is not significant at the five-percent level. 
 
<Table 5: Coefficients of micro/macro-models on pre-transfer poverty> 
 
The other two influences prove to be robust if we include all indicators in a joint model 
(M3) and also after controlling for economic growth and unemployment (M4). If we 
move to more complex models, we see that only the influence of bargaining centralisa-
tion is robust. If we include micro-level influences (M5a-e, M6), the influence of inter-
generational dependence (unemployed living with parents) becomes insignificant.
12 It is 
more than probable that part of the effect is already picked up by the variables on 
household composition and employment structure at the micro level. As a consequence, 
the influence of bargaining centralisation is the only one that receives support in all 
models. This confirms the hypothesis that mainly labour market institutions have an 
impact at the distribution of pre-transfer poverty. 
  The models presented in Table 6 deal in the same manner with the influence of 
institutional and economic factors on the extent of poverty reduction. I expect that the 
degree of poverty reduction is primarily affected by welfare state characteristics. As 
  19seen above, the degree of country-level variance in poverty reduction is much higher 
than in the case of pre-transfer poverty. Nevertheless I start with simple models to 
document how the different factors affect each other. In a bivariate perspective (M2a-e) 
there are significant influences regarding the degree of decommodification and defami-
lisation. As expected, the extent of poverty reduction is higher in countries with higher 
replacement rates and more generous family benefits. Furthermore, the degree of pov-
erty reduction is lower in countries with higher intergenerational dependence. There is 
also a positive influence of family service expenditure. It is, however, difficult to ex-
plain why we find a positive effect. We cannot rule out that the variable picks up other, 
unobserved characteristics of welfare states.  
 
<Table 6: Coefficients of micro/macro-models on poverty reduction> 
 
Apart from the influence of expenditure on family benefits and services, none of 
the influences proves to be robust when we move to more elaborate models (M3-M7). 
Nevertheless the proportion of between-country variance (more than 15 percent, see 
M0) is reduced to less than a third. By comparing Model M3, M4, and Model M6 we 
see that most of this reduction is due to institutional factors. It is also important to note 
that bargaining centralisation—being the most relevant factor in the explanation of pre-
transfer poverty—plays no significant role in the explanation of poverty reduction via 
transfers. This result highlights the importance of distinguishing between institutional 
factors that alter the incidence of pre-transfer poverty and factors that have an impact on 
the extent of poverty reduction. As a preliminary conclusion, we can say that labour 
market institutions are important for the former while welfare state characteristics are 
important for the latter.  
 
  20<Table 7: Coefficients of models with cross-level interactions> 
 
After having examined person-level and country-level influences, I come now to the 
third and last step of the analysis. As argued above, it is most likely that institutional 
factors not only influence the general incidence of in-work poverty and the general ex-
tent of poverty reduction but also structure group-specific poverty risks. To test the re-
spective hypotheses, we look at models that contain a number of cross-level interaction 
effects (Table 7). Three models deal with pre-transfer poverty, a fourth the extent of 
poverty reduction. The results do not confirm all the hypotheses I discussed in Section 
4. Against the expectations, the poverty risk of employed persons with small children is 
higher in countries with higher spending on family services. This result is robust even if 
we do not control for the number of employed persons per household at the micro level, 
which is expected to pick up part of the institutional influence. The effect is smaller but 
still significant (results not reported). In contrast, there is evidence that low-qualified 
workers are less likely to be poor in countries with centralised bargaining systems. The 
results also support the hypothesis that the risk profile by age differs between countries 
with high and low intergenerational independence. The respective interaction effect is 
positive. Hence, the U-shaped influence of age is flattened out. This means that the pov-
erty risk is shifted from younger to older workers. While younger workers are protected 
in the family context, older workers face additional needs. The last model deals with the 
interaction between the generosity of family benefits and the extent of poverty reduction 
related to children in the household. We find a positive interaction effect, i.e., the more 
a country spends on family benefits, the more likely it is that workers with children will 
benefit from transfers and be able to move out of poverty. The fact that we find signifi-
cant cross-level influences in line with the expectations (with one exception) further 
supports the hypothesis about the relevance of institutional factors in explaining country 





This paper has analysed the incidence of in-work poverty and how it is reduced by the 
payment of social transfers in 20 European countries. This broad comparative perspec-
tive allowed for the separation of different institutional influences, namely the influence 
of the degree of decommodification, defamilisation and bargaining centralisation. In 
contrast to previous studies on the working poor, which have mainly described country 
differences in in-work poverty, this paper has focussed how such differences can be 
explained from a broader perspective. In general, the results confirm the overall hy-
pothesis of this paper that welfare state measures and labour market institutions both 
have an influence on in-work poverty. By analysing influences on pre-transfer poverty 
and poverty reduction separately, I demonstrated that these factors affect in-work pov-
erty in a varying manner. While bargaining centralisation proved to be relevant for the 
distribution of pre-transfer incomes only, the set-up of the transfer system (unemploy-
ment replacement rates, expenditure on family cash benefits) mainly impacted the ex-
tent of poverty reduction. Against my initial expectations, the availability of family ser-
vices strongly influences the extent of poverty reduction but has hardly any effect on 
pre-transfer poverty rates. Furthermore, workers with children are more likely to be 
poor in countries with higher spending on family services. If we argue that the availabil-
ity of family services—mainly childcare—is expected to increase the number of work-
ers within family households we would expect the opposite result. As already discussed, 
this result proved robust to modifications of the model as well. Another option would be 
  22to use indicators that better measure the concept of defamilisation. Unfortunately, up to 
now these are not available for a larger number of countries.  
Although the main focus of the paper has been to show the influences of welfare 
state measures and labour market institutions we should not ignore the fact that individ-
ual and household-related factors also play an important role in explaining who is work-
ing but poor and who is not. The analysis of pre-transfer in-work poverty indicates that 
the risk profile of the working poor does not differ from the risk profile in general pov-
erty studies. Workers with low resources who are living in households with higher 
needs and face larger restrictions are more likely to be poor. But also the extent of pov-
erty reduction is structured by individual and household-related factors. While workers 
with children are more likely to be pulled out of poverty, in particular in countries with 
high family cash benefits expenditures, other groups like migrants not only face a 
higher risk of being poor relative to the pre-transfer poverty line but are also less likely 
to receive transfers. It is likely that not only the differing availability of benefits but also 
differences in take-up rates shape the profile of the working poor after transfers are 
paid. 
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  26Tables: 
Table 1: Definition and sources of macro indicators
Concept Definition of indicator Source
Level of transfers Average net unemployment replacement rate 
(first five years following unemployment) as a 





Family cash benefits (public expenditure as a 
% of GDP) in 2003




Family services (public expenditure as a % 
of GDP) in 2003




Share of young unemployed (20-29 years) 








Table 2: Means and variation of macro indicators
mean s.d. min max
Unemployment replacement rate (% of APW wage) 61.9 18.9 6.0 79.0
Family cash benefits (expenditure as % of GDP) 1.5 0.7 0.4 3.5
Family services (expenditure as % of GDP) 1.0 0.5 0.3 2.3
Young unemployed living with parents (%) 48.0 23.6 11.3 82.7
Bargaining centralization (Index) 0.42 0.17 0.13 0.71
Unemployment rate (%) 8.20 4.12 4.40 19
Economic growth (real, in %) 3.16 1.43 0.90 5.5
Sources: See Table 1, own computations.  

















Denmark 8.9 4.8 4.7 0.6 4.1 52.5 0.6 46.0
Finland 7.4 3.8 3.8 0.2 3.6 51.1 0.2 48.6
Norway 9.0 4.8 4.9 0.7 4.2 54.5 0.8 46.7
Sweden 11.8 5.2 7.1 0.5 6.6 60.2 0.6 55.7
Austria 10.3 6.7 4.1 0.5 3.6 39.6 0.5 35.2
Belgium 6.3 3.9 2.9 0.5 2.4 46.2 0.5 38.6
France 11.6 6.1 6.0 0.4 5.5 51.3 0.5 47.6
Germany 9.9 5.2 5.0 0.3 4.7 50.6 0.4 47.1
Luxembourg 12.7 9.4 4.1 0.8 3.3 32.3 0.9 26.2
Netherlands 8.3 5.9 2.6 0.2 2.4 31.6 0.2 29.0
Ireland 9.7 5.8 4.3 0.4 3.9 44.5 0.5 39.9
United Kingdom 11.5 8.0 4.1 0.7 3.4 35.8 0.8 29.9
Greece 13.1 12.7 1.3 0.9 0.4 9.7 1.0 3.2
Italy 10.3 8.9 2.0 0.6 1.4 19.4 0.7 13.5
Portugal 14.5 13.3 2.3 1.1 1.2 16.0 1.3 8.5
Spain 11.1 10.3 1.7 0.9 0.8 15.7 1.1 7.2
Czech Republic 7.6 3.5 4.3 0.2 4.0 56.4 0.2 53.5
Hungary 17.6 9.8 8.6 0.8 7.8 49.0 1.0 44.5
Poland 16.5 13.7 3.9 1.1 2.9 23.8 1.3 17.3
Slovak Republic 11.5 8.9 3.0 0.5 2.6 26.4 0.5 22.4
mean 11.0 7.5 4.0 0.6 3.4 38.3 0.7 33.0
s.d. 2.9 3.2 1.8 0.3 1.9 15.6 0.3 16.4
min 6.3 3.5 1.3 0.2 0.4 9.7 0.2 3.2
max 17.6 13.7 8.6 1.1 7.8 60.2 1.3 55.7
Source: EU-SILC 2005 (weighted), own computations.
poverty rate absolute change of poverty rate relative change of poverty rate
Table 3: Pre-transfer poverty, post-transfer poverty and poverty reduction by country (working 
population)
 
  28M0 M1 M0 M1
age:
in years -0.119 *** -0.015
in squared years 0.0012 *** 0.0002 +
gender (ref.: male)
female 0.132 *** 0.327 ***
immigrant status (ref.: native)
migrant 0.689 *** -0.323 ***
education (ref.: ISCED 4-6)
ISCED 0-2 0.946 *** -0.114 +
ISCED 3 0.388 *** 0.031
marital status (ref.: else, male)
separated, divorced 0.086 -0.177
sep./div.*female 0.287 *** 0.028
number of children/persons in hh (by age)
0-2 years 0.672 *** 0.451 ***
3-5 years 0.456 *** 0.142 ***
6-12 years 0.439 *** 0.114 ***
13-17 years 0.670 *** -0.060 *
18+ years 0.371 *** 0.373 ***
number of employed household members ( by working time)
part-time -0.914 *** -0.255 ***
full-time -1.531 *** -0.475 ***
employment status (ref.: employee)
self-employed 1.236 *** -1.035 ***
working time (ref.: full-time)
part-time 0.811 *** -0.028
occupation, ISCO (ref.: legislators, senior officials, managers [1])
Professionals (2) -0.568 *** 0.417 ***
Technicians and associate professionals (3) -0.171 *** 0.444 ***
Clerks (4) -0.020 0.597 ***
Service workers, shop/market sales workers (5) 0.548 *** 0.493 ***
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers (6) 1.138 *** 0.141
Craft and trades related workers (7) 0.515 *** 0.522 ***
Plant and machine operators, assemblers (8) 0.306 *** 0.585 ***
Elementary occupations (9) 0.877 *** 0.416 ***
intercept -2.169 *** -1.217 *** -0.517 ** -1.408 ***
σ
2 (between countries) 0.145 0.157 0.614 0.533
rho 0.042 0.046 0.157 0.140
log-likelihood -56747 -44501 -10660 -9841
n (countries) 20 20 20 20
n (observations) 168003 168003 18304 18304
Source: EU-SILC 2005, own computations.
Notes:  Significant at p<0.001 (***), p<0.01 (**), p<0.05 (*), p<0.1 (*).
Pre-transfer poverty Poverty reduction
Table 4: Coefficients (log odds) of random intercept logit models on probability of pre-transfer 
poverty and poverty reduction
 
  29Table 5: Coefficients (log odds) of random intercept logit models on prob. of pre-transfer poverty
M2a-g




-0.006 0.005 0.005 -0.003 0.003 0.002
Family cash benefits 0.026 0.104 0.096 0.090 0.164 + 0.174
Family services -0.286 + 0.031 0.038 -0.039 0.189 0.211
Young unempl. living 
with parents
0.011 *** 0.012 ** 0.011 ** 0.006 0.008 0.005
Bargaining 
centralization
-1.300 ** -0.965 ** -0.910 ** -1.414 ** -1.333 ** -1.144 **
unemployment 0.005 0.022
economic growth 0.024 0.049
σ
2 (between countries) ‡ 0.052 0.051 ‡ 0.079 0.066
rho ‡ 0.016 0.015 ‡ 0.024 0.020
log-likelihood ‡ -56738 -56737 ‡ -44494 -44492
n (countries) 20 20 20 20 20 20
n (observations) 168003 168003 168003 168003 168003 168003
Source: EU-SILC 2005 and various sources (see Table 1), own computations.
models with macro-level variables 
only
models with micro- and macro-level 
variables
Notes: Significant at p<0.001 (***), p<0.01 (**), p<0.05 (*), p<0.1 (*). 1) Coefficients of seven bivariate models, 2) Macro-level 
coefficients of seven two-level models including all micro-level variables used in M1 (see Table 4). ‡) Not all information recorded for 
each of the seven models. But see Table A2 for information on between-country variance.   
Table 6: Coefficients (log odds) of random intercept logit models on probability of poverty reduction
M2a-g




0.021 * 0.004 0.004 0.021 ** 0.006 0.006
Family cash benefits 0.539 ** 0.429 ** 0.395 + 0.496 * 0.374 ** 0.314 +
Family services 0.901 *** 0.693 * 0.701 * 0.924 *** 0.727 ** 0.733 **
Young unempl. living 
with parents
-0.021 *** -0.004 -0.005 -0.021 *** -0.004 -0.004
Bargaining 
centralization
1.251 0.253 0.298 1.385 0.414 0.431
unemployment -0.001 -0.008
economic growth 0.043 0.057
σ
2 (between countries) ‡ 0.226 0.224 ‡ 0.149 0.147
rho ‡ 0.064 0.064 ‡ 0.043 0.043
log-likelihood ‡ -10650 -10650 ‡ -9829 -9829
n (countries) 20 20 20 20 20 20
n (observations) 18304 18304 18304 18304 18304 18304
Source: EU-SILC 2005 and various sources (see Table 1), own computations.
models with macro-level variables 
only
models with micro- and macro-level 
variables
Notes: Significant at p<0.001 (***), p<0.01 (**), p<0.05 (*), p<0.1 (*). 1) Coefficients of seven bivariate models, 2) Macro-level 
coefficients of seven two-level models including all micro-level variables used in M1 (see Table 4). ‡) Not all information recorded for 
each of the seven models. But see Table A2 for information on between-country variance.   
  30M8 M9 M10 M8
MACRO LEVEL:
A: Young unempl. living with parents -0.0057
B: Family services -0.149
C: Bargaining centralization -1.223 **
D: Family cash benefits 0.268
CROSS-LEVEL INTERACTIONS:
A*age 0.0003 ***
B*child (0-5years) 0.308 ***
C*ISCED 0-2 -0.711 ***
D*child (0-17 years) 0.166 ***
MICRO LEVEL:
age:
in years -0.135 *** -0.120 *** -0.120 *** -0.015
in squared years 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.0003 +
gender (ref.: male)
female 0.132 *** 0.130 *** 0.130 *** 0.320 ***
immigrant status (ref.: native)
migrant 0.693 *** 0.696 *** 0.692 *** -0.345 ***
education (ref.: ISCED 4-6)
ISCED 0-2 0.944 *** 0.950 *** 1.226 *** -0.117 +
ISCED 3 0.385 *** 0.391 *** 0.396 *** 0.029
marital status (ref.: else, male)
separated, divorced 0.096 + 0.086 0.085 -0.171
sep./div.*female 0.287 *** 0.290 *** 0.289 *** 0.022
number of children/persons in hh (by age)
0-2 years 0.665 *** 0.379 *** 0.670 *** 0.207 ***
3-5 years 0.453 *** 0.165 *** 0.454 *** -0.111 *
6-12 years 0.439 *** 0.438 *** 0.438 *** -0.136 ***
13-17 years 0.670 *** 0.672 *** 0.670 *** -0.305 ***
18+ years 0.372 *** 0.369 *** 0.370 *** 0.365 ***
number of employed household members ( by working time)
part-time -0.912 *** -0.917 *** -0.916 *** -0.262 ***
full-time -1.530 *** -1.535 *** -1.532 *** -0.480 ***
employment status (ref.: employed)
self-employed 1.234 *** 1.239 *** 1.237 *** -1.048 ***
working time (ref.: full-time)
part-time 0.812 *** 0.811 *** 0.811 *** -0.034
occupation, ISCO (ref.: legislators, senior officials, managers [1])
Professionals (2) -0.566 *** -0.570 *** -0.567 *** 0.413 ***
Technicians and associate professionals (3) -0.169 *** -0.172 *** -0.171 *** 0.446 ***
Clerks (4) -0.016 -0.017 -0.021 0.590 ***
Service workers, shop/market sales workers (5) 0.550 *** 0.552 *** 0.545 *** 0.490 ***
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers (6) 1.132 *** 1.140 *** 1.128 *** 0.146
Craft and trades related workers (7) 0.517 *** 0.517 *** 0.511 *** 0.520 ***
Plant and machine operators, assemblers (8) 0.307 *** 0.308 *** 0.303 *** 0.579 ***
Elementary occupations (9) 0.878 *** 0.879 *** 0.872 *** 0.415 ***
intercept -0.862 *** -1.847 *** -2.297 *** -0.879 **
σ
2 (between countries) 0.141 0.158 0.101 0.415
rho 0.041 0.046 0.030 0.112
log-likelihood -44471 -44443 -44482 -9805
n (countries) 20 20 20 20
n (observations) 168003 168003 168003 18304
Source: EU-SILC 2005 and various sources (see Table 1), own computations.
Notes:  Significant at p<0.001 (***), p<0.01 (**), p<0.05 (*), p<0.1 (*).
Poverty 
reduction Pre-transfer poverty
Table 7: Coefficients (log odds) of random intercept logit models on probability of pre-transfer 
poverty and poverty reduction
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Table A1: Correlation matrix of macro level variables
RRATE FAMB FAMS YUNEM CENTR UNEM GDPG
RRATE 1
FAMB 0.374 1
FAMS 0.285 0.049 1
YUNEM -0.629 -0.236 -0.641 1
CENTR 0.342 0.169 0.132 -0.374 1
UNEM -0.306 -0.445 -0.292 0.460 -0.390 1
GDPG -0.145 0.286 -0.313 0.379 -0.216 0.441 1
Sources: See Table 1.
Notes: RRATE: Unemployment replacement rate, FAMB: Family cash benefits, FAMS: Family services, YUNEM: Young 
unemployed living with parents, CENTR: Bargaining centralization, UNEM: Unemployment rate, GDPG: Economic growth.  
M2a-g M5a-g M2a-g M5a-g
Unemployment replacement rate 0.134 0.153 0.469 0.381
Family cash benefits 0.144 0.152 0.458 0.402
Family services 0.122 0.156 0.388 0.295
Young unempl. living with parents 0.083 0.140 0.386 0.300
Bargaining centralization 0.098 0.102 0.570 0.480
Unemployment 0.123 0.135 0.515 0.431
economic growth 0.115 0.121 0.612 0.530
Source: See Table 5 and 6.
pre-transfer poverty poverty reduction
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1 So far, I have only discussed the influence of the availability of transfers and ignored the question of 
benefit take-up, which also affects the degree of poverty reduction. Previous research has shown that 
take-up rates differ according to a number of personal and household characteristics (see Section 3). 
There is also evidence that take-up rates are influenced by characteristics of transfer systems. For exam-
ple, potential recipients are less likely to claim means-tested benefits or are kept away if the process of 
claiming is complex or degrading. However, cross-national evidence is rare (see for an overview Hernanz 
et al., 2004). On the basis of the existing results it is difficult to produce sound hypotheses concerning 
country-specific levels of non-take-up. Furthermore, without a simulation of the transfer system, which is 
beyond the scope of this paper, it is not possible to differentiate effects of the availability and the non-
take-up of transfers. Therefore, if there are relevant differences in the level of non-take-up—e.g. due to 
means-testing—these are partly picked up by indicators of transfer generosity, which are lower if trans-
fers are means-tested.  
2 Social transfers include unemployment benefits, sickness benefits, disability benefits, education-related 
allowances, family/children-related allowances, social assistance etc., and housing allowances.  
3 It would also be worthwhile to take into account the influence of taxation. Unfortunately, EU-SILC does 
not contain information on gross incomes for all countries. Therefore, the analyses deal with the effect of 
social transfers only. 
4 An inherent feature of the approach to comparing poverty rates based on pre-transfer and post-transfer 
poverty rates is that it makes the counterfactual assumption that the pre-transfer distribution would be the 
same if no transfers were available (Ringen, 1987; Bergh, 2005).  
5 This is due to the fact that we define two different poverty lines, one on the basis of pre-transfer income, 
a second on the basis of post-transfer income. Persons with an income near the pre-transfer poverty line 
who do not receive transfers are the most likely to be pushed into poverty in the process of redistribution. 
6 The categories of the variable in EU-SILC are not the same in every country. Therefore, the measure-
ment of migrants differs from country to country. In some countries persons are coded as natives who are 
coded as migrants in other countries. However, every person coded as migrant is either not born in a 
given country or/and does not have the nationality of the country he/she lives in. 
7 The benefit level differs according to household type and previous level of income. Hence, the OECD 
publishes figures for a number of different constellations. The indicator used in this analysis has been 
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calculated as the average of all group-specific indicators. Replacement rates refer to a five-year period 
following unemployment. 
8 The share of young unemployed living with their parents is highly correlated with some of the welfare 
state characteristics like the level of replacement rates (see Table A1). This is not unexpected as it reflects 
the fact that the family acts as provider of social security if the respective public systems are weak. Other 
indicators are only modestly correlated.  
9 There are different methods for estimating logistic regressions using random components for dichoto-
mous dependent variables. In some cases, these methods yield substantively different results (Guo and 
Zhao, 2000). The models in this paper are estimated with Stata 10 (xtlogit).  
10 The post-transfer poverty rates equal the in-work poverty rates published at the EUROSTAT website 
(State: 24. January 2008). There are, however, differences between figures from national social reporting 
and the EUROSTAT figures. For instance, poverty rates calculated on the basis of the German Socio-
Economic Panel (GSOEP) are much higher than on the basis of EU-SILC, which has lead to concern 
about a potential bias in the German EU-SILC sample (Hauser, 2008). However, since Germany is only 
one country of 20 in this comparison and its country ranking would not be completely different on the 
basis of alternative poverty rates, we have decided to run the following analyses on the basis of all coun-
tries where data are available.  
11 For the computation of the intraclass correlation I assume a person-level variance of π
2/3 which is im-
plied by the logistic distribution of the respective residuals (Snijders and Bosker, 1999: 224). 
12 Also for models which contain micro-level variables, I report the coefficients at the macro level only. 
In none of the models are the micro-level influences altered in a significant way compared to the models 
discussed so far (results not reported). 
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